INTRODUCTION

BioWatch is a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) program that operates as an early warning biodetection network. The program’s purpose is to detect pathogens, specifically agents of bioterrorism, that have been intentionally released in the air. Air samples are collected and routinely tested for the presence of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of select organisms. A confirmed positive laboratory test is referred to as a BioWatch Actionable Result (BAR).

The BioWatch system of air sampling and laboratory testing can assist public health officials in determining the presence of a biological release in the environment. Early warning of a biological release will enable local, state, and federal officials to assess risk to public health, initiate a criminal epidemiological investigation, and implement emergency response activities such as mass prophylaxis in order to mitigate the impact to the affected population.

In California, DHS has identified BioWatch Jurisdictions that may cross the boundaries of Operational Areas (OAs) and mutual aid regions to cover a vast majority of the population. Each BioWatch Jurisdiction has a Jurisdictional Coordinator (JC) and BioWatch Advisory Committee (BAC). Each BAC operates independently of other BACs. The BACs are responsible for writing and updating plans and procedures for the BioWatch Jurisdiction, including sampling guides, laboratory operations, crisis communication, and notification protocols. In addition, a California BAC (CA BAC) shares information and planning efforts between the Jurisdictional Coordinators in California.

Each BAC consists of representation from city and county health departments, emergency management, law enforcement, fire, transit, regional air quality management districts, BioWatch field and laboratory operations, and the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office. State representation on BACs is not a BioWatch program requirement but often includes the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) Emergency Preparedness Office (EPO), CDPH Division of Communicable Disease Control (DCDC), California National Guard (CNG), and California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES). Federal agency representation may include the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Defense (DOD), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

The CA BAC supports collaboration and consistency among the BioWatch Jurisdictions and outlines the roles and responsibilities of state agencies during a BAR. The CA BAC consists of representatives from local BACs in addition to state agency partners. In addition to providing
guidance and support to local BACs during planning, individual agencies represented on the CA BAC will be involved as needed in response activities.

Each BioWatch Jurisdiction has a laboratory that uses standardized laboratory procedures developed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and DOD. BioWatch laboratories process and test filters for the presence of select biological agents in addition to maintaining chain-of-custody of laboratory samples. BioWatch laboratory staff conduct laboratory operations under the supervision of the Laboratory Director, who is responsible for declaring a BAR. During the BAR determination process, the Laboratory Director (or designee) evaluates the results for a specific BioWatch collector filter sample and declares a BAR only if the reactive results meets an established threshold.

A Technical Laboratory Consultation Call (TLCC) with CDC and DHS subject matter experts is available for the BioWatch Laboratory Director to discuss and review results prior to declaring a BAR. Stringent assay development, on-going evaluation, quality control, quality assurance, and validation processes ensure high sensitivity and specificity. In response to a BAR, the Local Health Officer (LHO) or designee may request that environmental sampling be conducted in the vicinity of the positive BioWatch collector or another potentially significant location.

**OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW**

**BioWatch Actionable Result (BAR)**

A BAR is determined when laboratory test results meet an established threshold based on a predetermined algorithm. Only a BioWatch Laboratory Director or designee can declare a BAR. A BAR means that the BioWatch collector filter contained genetic material (DNA) from an organism tested by the BioWatch program. The collector location identifies a temporal and spatial relationship regarding the potential release. A BAR result is actionable, meaning that additional communication and coordination should take place to determine potential public health impact and response actions. **Due to the potential public health impact, any BAR should be considered at least an Unusual Event**¹ as defined by the California Public Health and Medical Emergency Operations Manual (EOM) and therefore trigger situation reporting.

A BAR does not necessarily mean that an intentional release or a terrorist attack has occurred or that there is a risk to the public’s health. The laboratory results alone cannot determine whether a viable biological agent is present or if that agent is infectious.

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¹ The definition of an “Unusual Event”, as used in the California Public Health and Medical Emergency Operations Manual (EOM), is provided at the end of this chapter.
A BAR will immediately require additional communication and coordination outside of the affected jurisdiction(s). Depending on the bioterrorist agent identified and other situational awareness, the response to a BAR could potentially require extensive resources and coordination, leading to emergency system activation.

An emergency system activation triggered by a BAR may include:

- Emergency response activities including risk communication and messaging collaboration with external partners. This may also require extensive resources and/or capabilities of the affected jurisdiction(s) and require the need to request additional resources through established processes outlined in the EOM.
- Declaration of a Local Health Emergency by an LHO
- Declaration of a Health Emergency by the State Public Health Officer
- Declaration of a Local Emergency by the Governing Body
- Declaration of a State of Emergency by the Governor
- Declaration of Emergency or Major Disaster by the President

Following a BAR, a series of conference calls are held in order to gather and share situational awareness.

1) **BioWatch Local Conference Call** (Required per BAC plans):
   a) The BioWatch Local Conference Call (BWLCC) is for the BioWatch Jurisdiction(s) declaring a BAR. The purpose is to conduct a public health and law enforcement risk assessment to determine an incident action plan including estimated local resource needs.
   b) Coordinated and facilitated by the LHO, BAC Chair, or designee, unless otherwise requested (e.g., the local jurisdiction could request that the state facilitate the call).
   c) May include regional representatives, state partners and surrounding OAs who are adjacent to BioWatch OAs, depending on the organism identified and other situational awareness (varies by BAC jurisdiction).
   d) Uses local conference call script.

2) **BioWatch State Conference Call** (Optional): If the affected jurisdiction(s) would like to convene a state call prior to the BioWatch National Conference Call, a BioWatch State Conference Call (BWSCC) may be convened by CDPH EPO and Cal OES. In addition, if two or more OAs have a BAR, a BWSCC may be convened after the affected BWLCCs have concluded. The BWSCC is:
a) A joint call between the affected BACs and state agencies (CDPH, Cal OES, and California Department of Food and Agriculture [CDFA]) to review post-BAR assessment and estimated local, state, and federal resource requirements. This call may also include affected OAs.

b) Coordinated and facilitated by CDPH EPO or Cal OES.

c) Includes notification and participation of regional, state, and federal Region IX (RIX) partners.

d) Will use the BWSCC script.

e) Will be followed by a BioWatch National Conference Call.

3) **BioWatch National Conference Call** (Required by DHS):

   a) The BWNCC is a joint call between the BioWatch Program Office, BioWatch federal partners, and the jurisdictions(s) declaring a BAR. The purpose of the BWNCC is to review available information and the jurisdiction’s initial post-BAR assessment and estimated local, state, and federal resource requirements.

   b) Coordinated and facilitated by DHS.

   c) BWNCC information will be provided on the BWLCC and/or BWSCC.

   d) Includes notification and participation of regional, state and federal RIX partners.

   e) BWNCC Framework script will be used.

4) **BioWatch State Risk Communications Conference Call** (Optional):

   a) The purpose of the BioWatch State Risk Communications Call (BWSRCC) is to coordinate messaging regarding BioWatch, BAR data, and response actions.

   b) This call provides situational awareness to the local and state Public Information Officer (PIO) community and develops a regional risk communication incident action plan for a BAR.

   c) This call is coordinated and facilitated by CDPH EPO or CDPH Office of Public Affairs (OPA) in conjunction with Cal OES and follows the State BioWatch Risk Communications Protocol.

**RESPONSE ACTIONS**

**Environmental Assessment**

- Environmental assessment in the context of the BioWatch program is a broad categorization of environmental surveillance activities conducted in response to a BAR that includes Phase I and Phase II sampling, source reconstruction and plume modeling, and review of the jurisdictional profile. The immediate goal of environmental assessment
following a BAR declaration is to collect information that, in conjunction with public health and criminal investigations, enhances post-BAR assessment and refines the initial characterization of the incident and its potential threat to public health.

Collection and testing of environmental samples should be initiated immediately following a BAR declaration using pre-developed sampling plans. The objectives for environmental sampling are to:

- Determine agent viability
- Estimate agent concentration and
- Estimate the extent of agent distribution

The environmental samples are analyzed at the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratory for secondary confirmation of agent and concentration, as well as viability.

Within each BioWatch Jurisdiction, the teams conducting environmental sampling utilize local plans, procedures, and resources. Environmental sampling teams may be comprised of city, county, state, or federal hazardous materials teams, county environmental or public health representatives, military installation teams, or Civil Support Teams (CST) from the CNG. The locally developed environmental sampling plans outline response protocols including team structure, sampling locations, staging areas, command and control, transportation of samples, and chain-of-custody.

Environmental sampling involves taking samples from pre-identified surfaces in the immediate vicinity of the positive BioWatch collector. The team collects from multiple surface locations and transports the samples to the identified laboratory for analysis. If additional environmental sampling resource needs are required outside of the affected OA, those requests should be submitted through the Medical and Health Operational Area Coordination (MHOAC) Program and Regional Disaster Medical and Health Coordination (RDMHC) Programs. There are BioWatch-trained environmental sampling teams located throughout the state.

**BioWatch/Laboratory Response Network (LRN) Laboratory**

- The BioWatch Laboratory is responsible for testing all BioWatch collector filters. Once a positive filter has been identified, additional testing and culturing is conducted by an LRN laboratory.

- The LHO, in conjunction with the regional BAC, may decide to expand BioWatch surveillance by additional filter collection or increased frequency of collection, requiring further laboratory testing. If this decision is made, the BioWatch Laboratory may have
resource needs, including surge staff support, consumable products, or other supply needs. DHS, through the BioWatch Program in the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office, has resources available to assist the local affected jurisdiction in such situations. These additional federal resources can be requested through the BioWatch Jurisdictional Coordinator.

☐ During a BioWatch response, environmental samples will not be processed by BioWatch Laboratories, but by pre-identified laboratories in the LRN network.

☐ The LRN Laboratory receiving environmental samples may become overwhelmed and require surge support. The LRN network, CDPH, and the CDC may have surge support available to an affected public health laboratory. Request for laboratory surge resource needs should be communicated through the MHOAC and RDMHC programs.

**Local Health Department (LHD)**

☐ The LHD for the jurisdiction that has a BAR assumes the lead for a BioWatch response in that jurisdiction, and is represented by either the LHO/Public Health Director or designee. The LHO/Public Health Director or designee may serve as the initial Incident Commander for a BioWatch response until Unified Command is established. If multiple OAs are affected, Area Command may be established.

☐ The LHD is responsible for the epidemiological and surveillance data collection, which is instrumental in decision-making during a BioWatch response.

☐ Following a BAR, the LHO or designee may need epidemiological surveillance support from outside the OA. If so, this should be requested through the MHOAC and RDMHC Programs.

☐ The LHD, as a key member of the MHOAC Program, is responsible for notifying MHOAC Program partners of a BAR and anticipated response actions.

☐ If medical and health resources are needed that cannot be obtained through existing agreements or commercial vendors, request resources through the MHOAC Program in accordance with local policies and procedures. Local policies and procedures will determine the appropriate contact within the MHOAC Program since MHOAC Program functions are typically shared between multiple departments including the LHD, EHD, Local Emergency Medical Services Agency (LEMSA) and mental/behavioral health agency. Include required logistical support (“wrap around services”) such as food, lodging, and fuel as part of the resource request. If non-medical and health resources are needed, request resources through the appropriate local agency in accordance with local policies and procedures and inform the MHOAC Program.
Local Emergency Medical Services Agency (LEMSA)

- Provide relevant situational information to the MHOAC Program in accordance with local policies and procedures.
- Coordinate with affected field-level entities, MHOAC Program, Incident Command/Unified Command and DOCs/EOCs in accordance with local policies and procedures.

MHOAC Program

- Notify:
  - RDMHC Program;
  - CDPH and the Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA) Duty Officer Programs (either directly or via the RDMHC Program); and
  - Emergency management agency for the OA and other agencies in accordance with local policies and procedures.

- As soon as possible (but no later than 2 hours after incident recognition), prepare and submit a Flash Report or a Medical and Health Situation Report containing the minimum data elements to the:
  - RDMHC Program;
  - CDPH and EMSA Duty Officer Programs (or MHCC if activated); and
  - Emergency management agency for the OA (or the OA EOC if activated).

- Provide updated Medical and Health Situation Reports as follows:
  - Once during each operational period at agreed upon times;
  - When significant changes in status, prognosis or actions are taken; and
  - In response to state/regional agency request as communicated by the RDMHC Program.

- Coordinate with the affected field-level entities, LHD, Environmental Health Department (EHD), LEMSA, and CDPH and EMSA Duty Officer Programs (or MHCC if activated) to share situational information.

- Coordinate with the RDMHC Program to obtain information, policy-level decisions for response activities, and guidance developed by state-level programs and coordinated through the MHCC.
Attempt to fill resource requests within the OA or by utilizing existing agreements (including day-to-day agreements, memoranda of understanding, or other emergency assistance agreements).

If requested resources cannot be obtained within the Operational Area or through existing agreements, prepare a Resource Request that includes the need for logistical support (“wrap around services”) such as food, lodging, and fuel. Submit the resource request to the:

- RDMHC Program, which will begin to coordinate the resource acquisition process; confirm receipt by the RDMHC Program
- Emergency management agency for the OA (or OA EOC if activated). Confirm receipt and entry into the resource tracking system used by Cal OES (currently, Cal EOC)

Ensure that situational information is provided to the RDMHC Program, emergency management agency for the OA (or OA EOC if activated), and CDPH and EMSA Duty Officers (or MHCC if activated) to support the requested resources. A Medical and Health Situation Report should be submitted with the resource request or as soon as possible.

Notify the requestor of the outcome of the request and delivery details if the request is filled.

Support the Medical and Health Branch of the OA EOC if activated.

**RDMHC Program**

- Notify and coordinate with the CDPH and EMSA Duty Officer (or MHCC if activated).
- Notify and coordinate with emergency management agencies in accordance with policies and procedures, including the Cal OES Regional Duty Officer (or REOC if activated).
- Confirm that the MHOAC Program submitted the Medical and Health Situation Report to the CDPH and EMSA Duty Officer Programs (or MHCC if activated); if not, submit immediately.
- Confirm that the MHOAC Program submitted the Medical and Health Situation Report to the emergency management agency for the OA (or OA EOC if activated); if not, submit immediately.
- Confirm that the Cal OES Regional Duty Officer (or REOC if activated) received the information contained in the Medical and Health Situation Report; if not, submit immediately.
If resources are requested, immediately begin the process of filling the resource request by coordinating with unaffected OAs within the Mutual Aid Region.

Coordinate with the Cal OES Regional Duty Officer (or REOC if activated) to ensure proper tracking and fulfillment of the resource request.

Notify the CDPH and EMSA Duty Officers (or MHCC if activated) that a resource request is being processed.

Notify the requesting MHOAC Program, CDPH and EMSA Duty Officers (or MHCC if activated), and Cal OES Regional Duty Officer (or REOC if activated) of the outcome of the request and delivery details if the request is filled within the Mutual Aid Region.

Coordinate with the MHCC to ensure that information, policy-level decisions for response activities, and guidance developed by State-level programs are distributed to the MHOAC Program(s).

Coordinate with CDPH and EMSA to support the Medical and Health Branch of the REOC if activated.

**CDPH Emergency Preparedness Office (EPO)**

Upon notification of a BAR through the California State Warning Center (CSWC), CDPH EPO will notify pertinent state-level partners including CDPH DCDC, EMSA, RDMHC Program, and senior-level CDPH representatives.

As part of its response activities, following the BioWatch calls previously described, CDPH EPO may coordinate a Statewide Conference Call with all 61 local health jurisdictions in coordination with Cal OES to inform health and medical stakeholders of BioWatch activity with public health significance that requires response actions. This call will be announced via an alert sent through the California Health Alert Network (CAHAN).

**CDPH Division of Communicable Disease Control (DCDC)**

The CDPH Division of Communicable Disease Control (DCDC) will be represented on the BioWatch Local (invitation to be on the call varies by jurisdiction), State, and National Conference Calls. As subject matter experts in bioterrorism (BT) agents, DCDC will support LHDs and laboratories upon request and through coordination with the CDPH Duty Officer Program or Medical and Health Coordination Center (MHCC) if activated.

DCDC has statewide surveillance systems in place and functioning at all times. DCDC is responsible for the oversight and coordination of the epidemiological and surveillance data collection throughout the state from all LHDs. All reportable communicable diseases and
outbreaks are reported through the California Reportable Disease Information Exchange (CalREDIE) system. The CalREDIE system allows for reporting and receipt of notifiable conditions. The data entered into CalREDIE are available to authorized users in real-time for review, analysis, reporting, and situational awareness, which are instrumental in decision-making during a BioWatch response.

The epidemiological and surveillance data will help guide the initial DCDC operational objectives for a BioWatch event, which are as follows:

1) Detect the appearance of the BT agent within human populations as quickly as possible;
2) Collaborate with other California agencies on the occurrence of the BT agent in animals, e.g., California Department of Food and Agriculture, California Department of Fish and Wildlife;
3) Identify the characteristics of the BT agent, its clinical presentation, and at-risk populations; and
4) Provide guidance and/or information to LHDs, healthcare providers, and other state and federal agencies concerning the epidemiological and clinical features of the BT agent, treatment options, and transmission characteristics.

**CDPH Emergency Pharmaceutical Services Unit (EPSU)**

CDPH EPSU is responsible for coordinating and managing requests for Medical Countermeasures (MCM) from local jurisdictions and ensuring those requests are submitted to HHS/ASPR and CDC as necessary.

**Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA) Duty Officer**

Notify and share information with local and state agencies, including the LEMSA, RDMHC Programs, MHOAC Programs, CDPH and Cal OES. If the MHCC activates, activities related to the specific incident are coordinated through the MHCC.

**Medical and Health Coordination Center (MHCC) (if activated)**

The MHCC may activate during a BioWatch event to coordinate the state-level response of CDPH, EMSA and the Department of Health Care Services. The MHCC functions as a central point of coordination between the involved state programs and RDMHC Programs, MHOAC Programs, LHD/EHDs, and LEMSAs. The MHCC will:

- Send an alert using CAHAN that the MHCC has activated, including MHCC contact information and hours of operation. (Note that the CDPH and EMSA Duty Officer Programs are the official points-of-contact outside MHCC operational hours.)
- Distribute state-level policy decisions, key information and guidance to the RDMHC Programs, MHOAC Programs, LHD/EHDs and LEMSAs, and support requests for state-level program information.

- Prepare a statewide Public Health and Medical (CA-ESF 8) Situation Report and distribute it to state and local partners in accordance with policies and procedures.

- Monitor medical and health resource requests, determine if state or federal resources are needed, fill the resource requests or request federal assistance through Cal OES.

- Coordinate statewide distribution of resources, including vaccines, pharmaceuticals and medical assets.

**California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES)**

- The California State Warning Center (CSWC) is responsible for initiating notifications to CDPH EPO and internally within Cal OES.

- The State Threat Assessment Center (STAC) is a DHS recognized State Intelligence Fusion Center that serves as California’s information sharing clearinghouse to statewide leadership and public safety community of emerging threats. Pursuant to the California BioWatch Risk Communications Plan, the STAC Awareness Response Team can be leveraged to support alert notification to governance, public safety stakeholders statewide, the California State Threat Assessment System (STAS), and the broader national network of fusion centers.

  The STAC coordinates its activities with STAS member Regional Threat Assessment Centers (RTACs) to gather, analyze, and disseminate critical information associated with homeland security and terrorism, and can facilitate pre-coordinated classified communication methods to BioWatch responders that hold valid security clearances.

- Cal OES may participate on the BWLCC and will participate on the BWSCC with representation from their Executive Duty Officer and Cal OES’ internal BioWatch Advisor. The Fire, Law, and Regional Duty Officers may also be notified of the Local and State calls, but for informational purposes only (varies by BAC jurisdiction). The Cal OES Director and/or the Chief Deputy Director, PIO, Deputy Director for Response and Recovery and BioWatch Advisor will participate on the BWNCC.

- Upon BAR declaration, Cal OES may activate the Regional Emergency Operations Center (REOC) and/or State Operations Center (SOC) in support of anticipated needs.
Monitor historical and current data regarding animals that are diagnosed with an infection that may be related to a BAR. This information informs decision makers about the potential for a naturally occurring outbreak as opposed to an intentional BT event, both of which may or may not require specific public health responses.

Participate on the BACs and provide pertinent intelligence on BioWatch Conference Calls following a BAR.

Lead law enforcement agency in the event the BAR is determined to be connected to a terrorist incident.

Conduct a Technical Laboratory Consultation Call (TLCC) with the BioWatch Program Office and Laboratory to review results before the BAR is declared.

Participate on the National Conference Call to consult on response actions as subject matter experts.

Supports local and state requests as needed, e.g., confirmatory testing.

Coordinate and facilitate the BWNCC and notify federal partners of a BAR.

Coordinate and facilitate the Post-BAR Awareness Conference Call with non-BAR declaring BioWatch jurisdictions.

Manage BioWatch-specific resources such as the Rapidly Deployable Laboratory, event reconstruction or plume modeling, field surge staff, BioWatch Laboratory surge staff, additional collectors and laboratory consumable supplies.
National Biosurveillance Integration Center

☐ Provide historical disease information for the BAR location to supplement current findings.

☐ Report on disease outbreaks both within and outside the U.S. that may be relevant to the BAR.

☐ Provide relevant recent scientific publications and any social media that could provide context to the BAR.

U.S. Health and Human Services (HHS) Region IX

☐ Participate on BWSCC and BWNCC.

☐ Coordinate federal public health resource requests such as medical countermeasures.

☐ Acts as the primary point of contact between ASPR and FEMA Region IX.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IX

☐ Coordinate the federal resource response in alignment with local and state representatives.

☐ Sets the stage for recovery.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region IX

☐ Serve as the lead federal agency during the recovery phase of a hazardous materials emergency.

☐ Provide environmental sampling support upon request.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Specialized resources currently maintained by CDPH include:

- Subject matter expertise in epidemiology, surveillance, communicable disease control, veterinary medicine and vector control;
- Subject matter expertise for state-level communications including hotlines to support healthcare providers and LHDs and to provide public information;
- Policy and guidance preparation, including guidance on community mitigation activities, use of medical countermeasures and infection control;
• Assistance with obtaining and distributing certain vaccines and antibiotics through the SNS stockpile; and
• Laboratory analytical capability for identification and confirmation of infectious disease agents.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

California State Warning Center (CSWC)

Note: Hazardous materials spills or releases must be reported immediately to the California State Warning Center (CSWC). Other notifications may be required to comply with state and federal statutes and regulations.

Telephone: (916) 845-8911  Email: Warning.Center@oes.ca.gov

California State Threat Assessment Center (STAC) Duty Analyst

Telephone: (916) 636-2900  Email: STAC@caloes.ca.gov

CDPH Duty Officer

Telephone: (916) 328-3605  Email: CDPHDutyOfficer@cdph.ca.gov

EMSA Duty Officer

Email: EMSADutyOfficer@ems.ca.gov
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<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
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<td>ASPR</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response</td>
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<td>BAC</td>
<td>BioWatch Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>BAR</td>
<td>BioWatch Actionable Result</td>
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<td>BT</td>
<td>Bioterrorism</td>
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<td>DNA</td>
<td>Deoxyribonucleic Acid</td>
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<td>Jurisdictional Coordinator</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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